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The document similarity detection is an important technique used in many applications. The 
existence of the tool that guarantees the privacy protection of the documents during the comparison 
will expand the area where this technique can be applied. The goal of this project is to develop a 
method for privacy-preserving document similarity detection capable to identify either semantically 
or syntactically similar documents. As the result two methods were designed, implemented, and 
evaluated. In the first method privacy-preserving data comparison protocol was applied for secure 
comparison. This original protocol was created as a part of this thesis. In the second method 
modified private-matching scheme was used. In both methods the Natural Language processing 
techniques were utilized to capture the semantic relations between documents. During the testing 
phase the first method was found to be too slow for the practical application. The second method, 
on the contrary, was rather fast and effective. It can be used for creation of the tool for detecting 





























Privacy-preserving document similarity detection 
 
Group 13: Ksenia Khelik 
 
Detection of document similarity is an important problem with many applications in the areas of for 
instance plagiarism detection, copyright protection, file management, document searching etc. 
There can be distinguished two types of document similarity: syntactic and semantic one. The 
documents are syntactically similar if they are written with the same words. The documents are 
semantically similar if they contain the same information. Many tools have been developed for 
documents comparisons based both on semantic and syntactic analysis.  
In this project we consider the problem of privacy-preserving similarity detection of documents. 
Such solution is needed when users want to compare documents without disclosing them to each 
other. The privacy-preserving similarity detection implies existence of the secure protocol that 
protects document contexts from disclosing to the other side during the comparison. The goal of 
this master project is to design and implement such solution in order to create a tool that can be 
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The document similarity detection is used in many different applications, such as plagiarism 
detection, copyright protection and file management. A lot of methods are developed and many 
tools, i.e. [23], [24], [25], were created in order to effectively compare the documents, but only few 
of these methods ([6], [10], [14]) and none of tools can be applied to confidential document 
similarity detection. The handling of the documents of such type implies the comparison process is 
organized in such way that it guarantees the privacy protection of document contents.  The existing 
methods, satisfying this condition, reveal only the syntactically similar confidential documents. In 
this project it was attempted to develop a method which along with a syntactic similarity can also 
detect a semantic one in the privacy-preserving way.  
1.1 Background 
The document similarity detection is an important technique used in many applications. It can be 
applied to efficient data management, to detection of copyright violations and plagiarism. But only 
few of the existing methods and none of tools provide privacy protection of the documents they 
compare. Development of the method for privacy-preserving documents comparison enables to 
expand the area where document similarity detection can be applied. Some examples of privacy-
preserving similar document detection usage are given below. 
 
At first it can be used in universities to prevent plagiarism in project reports. Sometimes project can 
be given by the company. Working on such project, a student can get an access to some 
company’s confidential documents and use their parts in his or her report without references. The 
creation of a common database, consisting of companies’ documents, related to the project topics, 
can help to deal with this problem. The presence of a secure protocol for data transfer and 
comparison will provide documents confidentiality. At second, this technique can be applied to 
reveal duplicated conference registrations or paper submissions. Nowadays, there is no effective 
procedure to detect the paper that is submitted to obtain the permission for the author to participate 
in different conferences or to be published in different journals. Privacy-preserving document 
similarity detection enables to unite conference committees or journal redactors to find dishonest 
applicants. Thirdly, this tool can help the customers to decide whether or not they need to buy the 
chosen articles or books. In many online book shops there is no preview option available, so 
sometimes it is impossible to check if this article or book is the same one that the customer already 
has or how many changes the authors have made in their new editions as compared to the 
previous ones. Opportunities, the privacy-preserving document similarity detection provides, allows 
the customer to resolve doubts before buying without infringing the copyrights.  
 
It can be distinguished 4 kinds of document similarity: semantic, syntactic, lexical and structural one. 
In this project only semantic and syntactic similarities are taken into consideration. Two documents 
are syntactically similar if they are written with the same words placed in the same order. The 
documents are semantically similar if they contain the same information possibly written with 
different words. Unfortunately, it is not always enough to check only whether the documents are 
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syntactically similar. Very often different changes are applied to the document to hide the fact that 
this document is a copy of another one. The most widespread methods are: changing the order of 
words, sentences, paragraphs, using synonyms, paraphrasing the sentences, adding and/or 
deleting some parts. So in order to compare the documents correctly, it is also necessary to check 
the presence of semantic document similarity. The existence of the method, that detects both 
semantic and syntactic similarity and guarantees the privacy protection for the confidential 
documents, will improve the quality of document comparison and expand the area where document 
similarity detection can be applied. 
1.2 Problem statement 
Let Alice and Bob represent two parties each of whom has a collection of documents. The 
document is considered as a text, paragraph, sentence or just several distinct words. Both Alice’s 
and Bob’s documents are assumed to be confidential. The goal of this project is to develop a 
method that enables to detect whether or not Bob’s collection contains a document, similar to the 
some document from Alice’s collection without disclosing Bob’s data to Alice and vice-versa. This 
method should indentify either semantically or syntactically similar documents. 
 
The aim implies the creation of a secure protocol for privacy-preserving data comparison. This 
protocol should be design in such manner that it doesn’t require the presence of the trusted third 
party. 
1.3 Literature review 
Several approaches were proposed in order to detect the syntactically similar documents. One of 
the widely used methods is to introduce vector space model [1], [2], [3]. All words, met in both 
documents, form the global vector space. Then the individual vector for each document is created. 
This vector consists of elements representing how much times the words from global space 
appeared in the text. More common words the documents share, closer the vectors are. To find the 
distance between the vectors the cosine theorem [4] can be used. If the distance is greater than 
some pre-defined threshold, then the documents are considered to be similar.  
 
Some attempts were made to use vector space model for privacy-preserving document comparison. 
In [5] the authors proposed a method for similarity-based text retrieval that safeguard the content of 
the user queries and the retrieved documents. To provide the privacy the trusted third party was 
involved. In [6], [7] two different ways for privacy-preserving distance finding were described. The 
first one is based on random matrix-based privacy-preserving dot product protocol [8]. The second 
way is to employ the properties of homomorphic encryption. Both of these methods guarantee the 
privacy of the individual vectors and, consequently, the document contents.     
 
The comparison of the fingerprints is an alternative way to find a syntactical document similarity. 
The idea to map a text into a bit-string, called fingerprint, was introduced in [9] by M.O. Rubin. Later 
in [10] A. Z. Broder showed how Rubin’s fingerprints can be applied for similar document detection. 
Since then, some work has been done to optimize this approach. In [11] the attack-resistant 
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method for identifying plagiarized documents was presented. The security was provided by 
unpredictable fingerprint counting process. The algorithms, described in [12], [13], were able to 
detect near-duplicated documents. As fingerprints comparison doesn’t reveal the document 
contents to another party, it can be used for privacy-preserving similarity detection. 
 
One more approach, called private matching scheme, was described in [14]. It was created to find 
the intersection of private datasets of two parties. The method is based on the homomorphic 
encryption properties that are used for operation performed on polynomial whose roots are the 
dataset elements of one of the party. Unfortunately, this scheme doesn’t provide confidentiality to 
all elements in datasets, but can be easy modified to be applied to privacy-preserving document 
similarity detection. 
 
As for revealing semantic similarity in the documents, the usage of the natural language processing 
techniques is one of the effective ways to do it. In [15] it was proposed to parse the document to 
extract the distinct words, called tokens. The parsing process includes the removal of high 
frequency words and the stemming of the remaining words. The obtained sets of tokens are used 
for documents comparison. In [16] it was experimentally shown that it is enough to compare only 
nouns, adjectives and verbs to detect the semantic similarity of the documents. The authors of [17], 
[18] suggested to use the ontology, as it enables to reflect semantic relationship between 
documents and make comparison process more effective. The overview of all natural language 
processing techniques that can be used for semantic similarity detection is given in [19].  
1.4 Problem solution 
The analysis of the existing methods for different document similarity types detection showed there 
is no such method that reveals both semantically and syntactically similar documents in privacy-
preserving way. So it was decided to combine some found approaches to be able to do it. As the 
result two methods were developed. Both of these methods have the following structure. At first for 
all documents of each party the areas, the documents are related to, are found employing ontology. 
Then every document is processed, using Natural Languages Processing techniques, and 
transformed into a set of distinct meaningful words, called footprint.  After that footprint and areas of 
each document of one party are compared respectively with a footprint and areas of every 
document of another party in privacy-preserving way. In the first method privacy-preserving data 
comparison protocol, created as a part of this thesis, was employ for secure comparison. In the 
second method private matching scheme [14] was applied after some modifications for this purpose.  






2 Theoretical background 
As it was mentioned in paragraph 1.4, two methods for privacy-preserving document similarity 
detection were developed. To create them, several approaches were used. They are Natural 
Language Processing techniques [19], private matching scheme [14], and privacy-preserving data 
comparison protocol. The description of these approaches is given in this chapter. 
2.1 Natural Language Processing 
 
Natural Language Processing (NLP) is a theoretically motivated range of computational techniques 
for analyzing and representing texts in natural human-languages [20]. All NLP systems aim to 
achieve a human-like performance during language processing. For this purpose they use different 
levels of linguistic analysis utilized by humans to produce or comprehend language. The following 
levels of linguistic analysis can be distinguished [20]: phonology, morphology, lexical, syntactic, 
semantic, discourse, and pragmatic one.  
 
Phonology level deals with the interpretation of speech sounds within and across words. The NLP 
systems analyze the sound waves and encoded them into a digitized signal for further processing. 
Morphology level analyzes the form and structure of words. All words are composed of the smallest 
units of meaning, called morphemes. Since the meaning of each morpheme remains the same 
across words, the NPL systems exploit this property to gain the meaning of the unknown words. At 
the lexical level the sentences are divided into separate words. The NLP system assigns the part-
of-speech tag to each word according to the context in which this word occurs and then determines 
its possible meanings. Syntactic level focuses on analyzing the words in a sentence in order to 
uncover the structural dependency between the words. The semantic level goal is to determine the 
meaning of the sentences based on the words meanings. This stage includes the semantic 
disambiguation of polysemous words. Discourse and pragmatic levels are the highest levels of 
processing. Discourse is focusing on finding of the connections between sentences. Pragmatic 
level is concentrated on the context over and above the text contents for better text understanding 
[20].  
 
The NLP techniques are used in many applications, such as information retrieval, text mining, 
language understanding, and text classification.  The description of the often-used techniques is 
given below. 
 
2.1.1 Natural Language Processing techniques 
 
Stop list 
Stop list contains high frequency words, such as ’of’, ‘a’, or ‘is’. Usually these words are ignored to 
improve the performance. But in some applications, i.e. text mining, they can help to determine a 





Stemming is the process of reducing the word to its root. For example, ‘derives’ and ‘derivation’ can 
be replaced by ‘deriv’. It leads to the reducing of the number of meaningful words, but can also 
affect the semantics.  
 
Lemmatization  
Lemmatization is the process of reducing the word to its canonical form. For example, ‘is’, ’are’, and 
‘been’ will be replaced by ‘be’. As well as stemming, it leads to reducing the number of meaningful 
words, but make it in more proper way, using vocabulary and morphology analysis of the words [21]. 
 
Noisy data 
Noisy data refers to the words with spelling mistakes, acronyms and abbreviations. It can be very 
useful to correct all mistakes and to replace all acronyms and abbreviations at the beginning of 
analysis.  
 
Word sense disambiguation 
The word sense disambiguation problem is about finding out the most probable meaning of a 
polysemous word [19]. Several approaches can be used to deal with this problem: dictionary and 
knowledge based, supervised, and unsupervised methods. Dictionary and knowledge based 
methods suppose that the sense of the word can be extracted from definitions of the words, so they 
use dictionaries, thesauri and other lexical knowledge bases. Supervised methods mainly adopt 
context to disambiguate words. These methods include training and testing phases. In the training 
phase, a sense-annotated training corpus is required, from which syntactic and semantic features 
are extracted to create a classifier using machine learning techniques [22]. When lexical knowledge 
bases or training data are unavailable, the unsupervised methods are used. These methods 
acquire contextual information directly from unannotated raw text, and senses can be induced from 
text using some similarity measure [22].  
 
Part of speech tagging 
Part of speech (POS) tagging is a process of assigning a part of speech to each word in a sentence. 
It helps to determine the right word sense. There following basic POS tags are used by all taggers: 
verb, noun, pronoun, adjective, adverb, preposition, conjunction, and interjection with some taggers 
adding the article [16]. Many tagging systems extend these basic tags to describe additional 
grammatical features, such as singular/plural, number, tense, gender, and even punctuation [16]. 
 
Ontology 
Ontology is a knowledge structure that specified terms, their properties and relations among them 
to enable knowledge extraction from the text [18]. It consists of concept, concept-relations, axiom 
and instances [19].The selection of concepts depends on the task and the domain information that 
need to be captured. Thus before constructing the ontology, it is important to know what it will be 
used for. The ontology reflects the structure of the certain domain and clarifies the meaning of 
thespecial terms appeared in the text. Thus it can be used to provide expert, background 
knowledge about the domain and constrain the possible senses of the terms. The application of 
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Tokenization is the process of breaking up the sequence of characters in a text by locating the word 
boundaries, the points where one word ends and another begins [26]. The derived words are called 
tokens. Tokenization is rather easy task for the languages, like English, Russian, or German, in 
which words are separated by space character. But it can be complicated for Chinese and some 
other languages, because a word may be represented as a single character or series of several 
characters, and there may be no space between words [26].     
2.2 Private matching scheme 
Private matching (PM) scheme was proposed in [14] by B. Pinkas, M.J. Freedman and K. Nissim, 
to find the intersection of private datasets elements taken from the same domain. It is a two-party 
protocol based on the use of encryption function ܧ݊ܿ, satisfying following properties: 
 
(1)  Encryption function is a homomorphic function:  
Given two ciphertexts ܧ݊ܿሺ݉ଵሻ and ܧ݊ܿሺ݉ଶሻ, then ܧ݊ܿሺ݉ଵ ൅ ݉ଶሻ ൌ ܧ݊ܿሺ݉ଵሻ ْ ܧ݊ܿሺ݉ଶሻ, for some 
operation . 
 
(2) It allows multiplication by a constant: 
Given ciphertext ܧ݊ܿሺ݉ሻ and some constant ܿ, then it’s possible to compute ܧ݊ܿሺܿ · ݉ሻ, without 
decrypting ciphertext 
 
As an example of the encryption function, satisfying these properties, Paillier’s cryptosystem [27] 
can be taken. It is described in paragraph 2.2.2. 
 
2.2.1 Private matching scheme description 
Let Alice and Bob represent two parties. Alice’s input is a set ܺ ൌ ሼݔଵ, … , ݔேሽ from some domain, 
Bob’s input is a set Yൌ ሼݕଵ, … , ݕ௄ሽ  from the same domain. According to [14] protocol has the 
following basic structure. Alice defines a polynomial P, whose roots are her inputs: 





She sends to Bob encrypted coefficients of this polynomial. Bob employs the homomorphic 
properties of the encryption system to evaluate the polynomial at each of his inputs. Then he 
multiplies each result by a random number r, adds to it an encryption of the value of his input, to get 
 ܧ݊ܿሺݎଵ · ܲሺݕଵሻ ൅ ݕଵሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄ · ܲሺݕ௄ሻ ൅ ݕ௄ሻ  and sends them to Alice. She decrypts received 
values and compares obtained values with her inputs. The result is a number of common elements 
and their values. Other decrypted values, not equal to some Alice’s element values, are just 
random numbers, and don’t reveal the corresponding Bob’s element values. The scheme is 
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organized in such way that Bob can’t know the Alice’s element values. The detailed protocol 












2. Define the polynomial P with 
roots ݔଵ, … , ݔே and coefficients   




3. Encrypt coefficients, to get 
set  ሼܧ݊ܿሺܽ଴ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺܽேሻሽ 
  
  
ሼܧ݊ܿሺܽ଴ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺܽேሻሽ 
 
 
  For every Bob’s input y repeat steps 1-2:    
  1. Choose a random value r  
  2. compute ܧ݊ܿሺݎ · ܲሺݕሻ ൅ ݕሻ  
  
3. randomly permute  
ܧ݊ܿሺݎଵ · ܲሺݕଵሻ ൅ ݕଵሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄ ·
ܲݕܭ൅ݕܭ to get  




ᇱ · ܲሺݕଵԢሻ ൅ ݕଵԢሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄
ᇱ · ܲሺݕ௄Ԣሻ ൅ ݕ௄Ԣሻ 
 
 
4. Decrypt  ciphertexts received 
and compare obtained values 




5. Return the number of 




Figure 1: Private matching scheme outline 
 
2.2.2 Paillier’s cryptosystem  
Paillier’s cryptosystem was first proposed in [27]. This is a public-key encryption, based on usual 
modular arithmetic.  
 
Key generation  
1. Choose two large prime numbers ݌ and ݍ 
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2. Set  ݊ ൌ ݌ · ݍ and  ߣ ൌ ݈ܿ݉ሺ݌ െ 1, ݍ െ 1ሻ 
3. Randomly select ݃ א Ժ௡మ
כ  : gcdሺ௚
ഊ௠௢ௗ௡మିଵ
௡
, ݊ሻ ൌ 1 
4. Consider ݊, ݃ as public parameters and ݌, ݍ as private ones. 
 
Encryption 
1. Given message ݉ א Ժ௡כ   
2. Select a random ݎ ൏ ݊ 
3. Compute ciphertext ܿ ൌ ݃௠ · ݎ௡ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ 
 
Decryption 
1. Given ciphertext ܿ א Ժ௡మ
כ  
2. Compute plaintext ݉ ൌ ܮ൫ܿఒ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ൯ · ቀܮ൫݃ఒ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ൯ቁ
ିଵ





Paillier’s encryption function satisfies the following properties: 
 
1. It is a homomorphic function. 
 
Proof:  
׊ ݉ଵ, ݉ଶ א  ܼ௡כ : 
ܧ݊ܿሺ݉ଵ ൅ ݉ଶሻ ൌ ݃௠భା௠మ · ݎ௡ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ ൌ ݃௠భ · ݃௠మ · ݎ௡ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ ൌ
ൌ ሺ݃௠భ · ݎ௡ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶሻ · ሺ݃௠మ · ݎ௡ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶሻ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ ൌ ܧ݊ܿሺ݉ଵሻ · ܧ݊ܿሺ݉ଶሻ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ 
□ 
 
2. It allows multiplication by a constant  
 
Proof: ׊ ݉ א ܼ௡כ , ݇ א Գ “ 
ܧ݊ܿሺ݇ · ݉ሻ ൌ ݃௞·௠ · ݎ௡ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ ൌ ሺ݃௠ሻ௞ · ݎ௡ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ ൌ ሺ݃௠ · ݎ௡ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶሻ௞ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ ൌ 
                      ൌ ሺܧ݊ܿሺ݉ሻሻ௞݉݋݀݊ଶ 
□ 
 
Thus Paillier’s encryption function satisfies the properties listed in paragraph 2.2, so it can be used 
in private matching scheme described in paragraph Private matching scheme description 2.2.1  
 
2.3 Privacy-Preserving Data Comparison Protocol 
This original privacy-preserving data comparison protocol was created as an alternative way to 
perform documents comparison in privacy-preserving way. This protocol is based on the use of 
commutative encryption, that is: 
 
 If ܧ݊ܿଵ and ܧ݊ܿଶ are two commutative encryption functions and ݉ is a plaintext, then ciphertexts 




 As the example of commutative encryption, The Massey-Omura cryptosystem [28] can be used. It 
is described in paragraph 2.3.2.   
 
2.3.1 Privacy-preserving Data Comparison Protocol Description 
 
Let Alice and Bob represent two parties. Alice has a set of elements ܺ ൌ ሼݔଵ, … , ݔேሽ. Bob has a set 
of elements ܻ ൌ ሼݕଵ, … , ݕேሽ. Protocol is organized as follows.  
 
Alice and Bob define the commutative encryption functions ܧ݊ܿଵ and ܧ݊ܿଶ, respectively. Both of 
them encrypt their elements with the corresponding encryption function and send the obtained sets 
to each other. Having received the encrypted Alice’s elements, Bob encrypts them, using ܧ݊ܿଶ, 
permutes and sends to Alice. Meanwhile, Alice encrypts Bob’s encrypted elements, using ܧ݊ܿଵ.  
Then she receives back her elements, modified by Bob. At the moment Alice has two sets: 
ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܺԢሻ and ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺܻሻ. Because of commutative encryption property, the ciphertexts of the 
elements, that contains in X and Y set intersection, are identical.  So the number of common 
elements in ܺ, ܻ sets are the same as the number of common elements in  ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܺԢሻ  and ܧ݊ܿଵ 
ܧ݊ܿଶሺܻሻ sets. All Alice needs to get a result is to compare these new sets. Since Bob has shuffled 
Alice’s encrypted elements, Alice can’t determine which of her elements are identical to Bob’s ones. 






1. Choose the parameters for a 
homomorphic encryption function ܧ݊ܿଵ 
 
 1. Choose the parameters for a 
homomorphic encryption function ܧ݊ܿଶ 
 
2. Encrypt Alice’s elements with ܧ݊ܿଵ 
to get set ܧଵሺܺሻ 
 
 2. Encrypt Bob’s elements with ܧ݊ܿଶ to 
get ܧଶሺܻሻ 
 








3. Encrypt ܧଶሺܻሻwith  ܧ݊ܿଵ  to get set 
ܧଵܧଶሺܻሻ  
 
 3. Encrypt ܧଵሺܺሻ  with ܧ݊ܿଶ  to get set 
ܧଶܧଵሺܺሻ 
  4. Randomly permute ܧଶܧଵሺܺሻ to get set 
ܧଶܧଵሺܺԢሻ 
 
 ܧଶܧଵሺܺԢሻ  
 
 
4. compare ܧଵܧଶሺܻሻand ܧଶܧଵሺܺԢሻ 






Figure 2: Privacy-preserving data comparison protocol outline 
 
2.3.2 Massey-Omura cryptosystem 
The Massey-Omura cryptosystem was described in [28]. It was created for secure data transfer 
between 2 parties. Let Alice and Bob represent two parties. Alice needs to send message M to Bob. 
The message transfer scheme is described below. 
 
Key generation: 
1. Alice choose a large prime number ݍ  
2. ݍ is considered as a public key 
3. Alice selects a random positive integer ݁ଵ , such that ݁ଵ ൏ ݍ  and ݃ܿ݀ሺ݁ଵ, ݍ െ 1ሻ ൌ 1 , and 
computes  ݀ଵ ൌ ݁ଵିଵ݉݋݀ ݍ െ 1 
4. Bob selects a random positive integer ݁ଶ, such that ݁ଶ ൏ ݍ and ݃ܿ݀ሺ݁ଶ, ݍ െ 1ሻ ൌ 1, and computes  
 ݀ଶ ൌ ݁ଶିଵ݉݋݀ ݍ െ 1 
5. ݁ଵ, ݀ଵ are Alice’s private keys, ݁ଶ, ݀ଶ are Bob’s private keys. 
 
Encryption: 
1. Given message ݉ א Ժ௤כ  
2. Let ݁ be a private key 
3. Compute ciphertext ܿ ൌ ܯ௘ ݉݋݀ ݍ 
 
Decryption: 
1. Given ciphertext ܿ߳Ժ௤כ  
2. Let ݀ be a private key, such that ݀ ൌ ݁ିଵ ݉݋݀ ݍ െ 1 
3. Compute message ݉ ൌ ܿௗ ݉݋݀ ݍ 
 
Message transfer: 
The Massey-Omura cryptosystem requires three messages to be sent to achieve a secure 
transmission. This process is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Alice  Bob 
   
Alice needs to send a 
message ܯ 
  
   1. ܣ ൌ ܯ௘భ݉݋݀ ݍ  
   
 2. Bൌ ܣ௘మ݉݋݀ ݍ  
   
     3. Cൌ ܤௗభ݉݋݀ ݍ   
   
  4. Bob calculates ܦ ൌ ܥௗమ݉݋݀ ݍ 
and gets the message ܯ, that is 
equal to ܦ 






Massey-Omura cryptosystem satisfies the property of commutative encryption. 
 
Proof:  
Let ݍ be a public key. ܧ݊ܿଵ is an encryption function with ݁ ଵ private key, and ܧ݊ܿଶ is an encryption 
function with ݁ଶ private key. Given message ݉ א Ժ௤כ . Then 
ܧ݊ܿଵ൫ܧ݊ܿଶሺܯሻ൯ ൌ ܧ݊ܿଵሺܯ௘మ ݉݋݀ ݍሻ ൌ ሺܯ௘మሻ௘భ ݉݋݀ ݍ ൌ ܯ௘భ·௘మ݉݋݀ ݍ ൌ  
ൌ ሺܯ௘భሻ௘మ ݉݋݀ ݍ ൌ ܧ݊ܿଶሺܯ௘భ ݉݋݀ ݍሻ ൌ ܧ݊ܿଶ൫ܧ݊ܿଵሺܯሻ൯ 
□  
 
Thus, Massey-Omura encryption functions satisfy the property mentioned in paragraph 2.3. So they 




Within the bounds of IKT590 project, two methods for privacy-preserving documents similarity 
detection were designed, implemented and tested. The description of these steps is given in this 
chapter.    
3.1 Requirements 
As it was said in paragraph 1.2, the goal of this project is to develop a method for privacy-
preserving document similarity detection. This method should satisfy the following requirements: 
 
General requirements: 
1. It should take as little time as possible. 
2. The number of data transfers should be minimized. 
   
Functional requirements: 
1. It should find semantically similar documents. 
2. It should find syntactically similar documents. 
3. It should detect a document that is a part of another one. 
4. It should detect documents that contain common part. 
5. It should be possible to compare several documents at once. 
 
Security requirements: 
1. No third party should be involved.  
2. It is allowed to know the number of words, participating in comparison. 
3. Every party have a right to know the number of words, containing in both compared 
documents.  
4. There should be no way to know the words, containing in both compared documents. 
5. There should be no way for each party to know the words of another party. 
3.2 Input Data 
For each party input data are one or several documents in .txt format. The documents should be 
written in English language. The tables and drawing are not processed. The documents, containing 
none or one word, don’t participate in the comparison process. 
3.3 Output Data 
The output data shows the type of similarity relationship between each document of one party and 
each document of another party. Let ܦ݋ܿଵ and ܦ݋ܿଶ are two documents, have been compared. The 
similarity relationship types between them can be following:  
 
1. The documents are syntactically similar (duplicates) 
2. The documents are almost syntactically similar (near duplicates) 
3. The documents are semantically similar 
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4. The documents share common part 
5. ܦ݋ܿଵ is a semantically similar to some part of ܦ݋ܿଶ 
6. ܦ݋ܿଶ is a semantically similar to some part of ܦ݋ܿଵ 
7. Documents are different 
3.4 Design Specification  
According to the requirements, given in paragraph 3.1, two methods for privacy-preserving 
document similarity detection were designed and implemented. In this chapter the detailed 
overview of these methods can be found. 
 
3.4.1 Methods overview 
Let Alice and Bob represent two parties. Alice has a set of documents ܦ݋ܿ_ܣ, Bob has a set of 
documents ܦ݋ܿ_ܤ. They want to know the types of similarity relationship between their documents. 
To find the answer, they use one of two developed methods: Method 1 or Method 2. These 
methods have similar basic structure. 
 
At first Alice and Bob prepare their documents and determine the areas, the documents are related 
to, using ontology. Then each party process every document, applying Natural Language 
Processing techniques described in paragraph 2.1.1, and transforms it to the set of distinct 
meaningful words, called footprint. According to the method parties have chosen, Alice compares 
her every footprint with each Bob’s one in privacy-preserving way and gets the number of common 
words in each footprint pair. Also she finds the semantic relationship between her and Bob’s 
documents performing the secure area names comparison. To guarantee the privacy of footprints 
and area names during comparison process, Method 1 employs the privacy-preserving data 
comparison protocol, while Method 2 uses the modified private-matching scheme. According to the 
numbers of common words and semantic relationship, Alice finds the types of similarity relationship 
between her and Bob’s documents. The generalized description of privacy-preserving document 





For every Alice’s document repeat 
steps 1-2: 
 For every Bob’s document repeat 
steps 1-2: 
1. Find areas, document is 
related to 
 
 1. Find areas, document is 
related to 
2. Find footprint 
 
 2. Find footprint 
3. Compare every Alice’s footprint 
with each Bob’s footprint according 
to the selected method to get the 
number of common words  
 
 3. Participate in footprint 
comparison process 
4. Compare area names of every 
Alice’s document with areas 
name’s of every Bob’s document 




according to selected method to get 
the semantic relationship between 
documents 
 
5. Find result according to the 




Figure 4: Privacy-preserving document similarity detection process outline 
 
3.4.2 Areas finding  
To find the areas, document is related to, ontology is used. It is one of the Natural Language 
Processing technique described in paragraph 2.1.1. Ontology consists of areas that, in turn, can 
contain some other areas. Every area is described by the set of terms in an unique way. Each term 
can be a phrase or a single word. It is allowed to include the same term in several sets. The 
ontology structure is presented in Figure 5.      
 
 
Figure 5: Ontology structure 
The areas are determined according to the ontology terms the document contains. The finding 
process consists of following steps: 
 
 For every ontology area repeat steps 1-2: 
1. Search for all terms this area is described by.  
2. If the number of found terms is greater than some predefined value, add the name of this area 
to the list of area names 
3. Return the list of area names  
 
The threshold was introduced to avoid the wrong area detection in the following cases:  
1. There are homonymous words to the ontology terms in the document 
2. A few terms from some area are mentioned in the document, but the document actually isn’t 




3.4.3 Footprint finding 
Footprint finding is a second step in a privacy-preserving document similarity detection process. It 
is based on the application of several Natural language processing techniques described in 
paragraph 2.1.1. This step is performed to transform a document into a set of distinct meaningful 
words, called footprints. Meaningful words are the words reflecting the semantics of the document 
content. They are nouns, adjectives and verbs. In [16] it was experimentally shown by the example 
of English language that it is enough to compare only the words, marked with these parts of speech, 
in order to detect the semantic similarity of the documents. The removal of other parts of speech 
allows to increase the algorithm performance during the footprint comparison step. But there is one 
disadvantage of this approach. The users can’t be sure whether the documents are 100% identical 
in case of document footprints equality. If it is important for the users, the additional word-by-word 
documents comparison can be performed.  
 
The following Natural Language Processing techniques are used to find document footprint: 
tokenization, part-of-speech tagging, stemming. All of them, except tokenization, require the 
presence of the knowledge base. 
 
The footprint finding process starts with the knowledge base preparation (it will be explained in 
3.5.1.1). Then all letters are converted to lower-case and the document is divided into separate 
words, called token. After that every token is marked with appropriate part-of-speech tag and the 
ones with noun, adjective and verbs tags are selected. The chosen tokens are stemmed. Then 
repetitions in list of stemmed tokens are deleted and footprint is ready. The overview of the footprint 
finding process is shown in Figure 6.  
 
1. Prepare knowledge base 
2. Convert all letters to lower-case 
3. Perform document tokenization 
4. Perform part-of-speech tagging 
5. Choose words with nouns, verbs and adjectives tags. 
6. Perform stemming 
7. Delete repetitions 
Figure 6: Footprint finding process 
 
3.4.4 Footprint comparison 
During the footprint comparison step every footprint of one party is compared with each footprint of 
another party and number of common words between them is found. The comparison is performed 
by one of the parties. Let it be Alice. According to the chosen method for privacy-preserving 
document similarity detection, she can compare the footprints in one of two ways: using privacy-
preserving data comparison protocol or applying modified private-matching scheme. The 
description of Method 1 and Method 2 footprint comparison steps are given below.  
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3.4.4.1 Method 1 footprint comparison algorithm 
 
Method 1 footprint comparison algorithm is based on privacy-preserving data interchanging 
protocol described in paragraph 2.3 and has the following structure. 
 
Let Alice has a set of footprints ܨ݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺ ൌ ሼ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺ଵ, … , ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺ேሽ.  Bob has a set of footprints 
ܨ݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻ ൌ ሼ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻ଵ, … , ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௄ሽ . The algorithm starts from the footprints preparation for 
comparison process. Alice divides each footprint into 2 subsets. The first one consists of the words, 
containing in all her footprints. The second one consists of the rest of the words, not containing in 
the first subset. Alice transforms every word in the subsets into numerical representation. As the 
result she gets subsets ܥ݋݉஺, ܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵ ,…, ܦ݂݅ ஺݂ே. The same actions are performed by Bob and he 
obtains the subsets ܥ݋݉஻, ܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵ,…,  ܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄. The footprints are divided into 2 subsets to avoid the 
encryption and transfer of the words that are in all footprints of one party several times. In some 
cases, e.g. when all documents are related to the same area, the saving of time can be significant.   
 
Then Alice and Bob define homomorphic encryption functions ܧ݊ܿଵ and ܧ݊ܿଶ, respectively. They 
encrypte their subsets with corresponding encryption functions and send them to each other. 
Having received the encrypted Alice’s subsets, Bob encrypts them with ܧ݊ܿଶ, permutes elements in 
every subset and sends to Alice. Meanwhile, Alice encrypts Bob’s encrypted subsets, using ܧ݊ܿଵ. 
Then she receives back her subsets, modified by Bob. At the moment Alice has following sets: 
ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܥ݋݉஺
ᇱ ሻ,  ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵᇱ ሻ , … , ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ேᇱ ሻ, ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺܥ݋݉஻ሻ, ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵሻ, …, 
 ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄ሻ . She unions ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܥ݋݉஺ᇱ ሻ  with ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵᇱ ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ேᇱ ሻ  to 
get her encrypted footprints ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺ଵᇱ ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺ேᇱ ሻ and unions 
ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺܥ݋݉஻ሻ  with  ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄ሻ  to get Bob’s encrypted footprints 
ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻ଵሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௄ሻ.Then she compares each of her encrypted footprints 
with every Bob’s encrypted footprint to find the number of common words. The detailed algorithm 





1. Find the words, that are in all Alice’s 
footprints and transform them into 
numerical representation to get set ܥ݋݉஺ 
 
 1. Find the words, that are in all Bob’s 
footprints and transform them into 
numerical representation to get set ܥ݋݉஻ 
For every Alice’s footprint ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺௜  repeat 
step 2: 
 
 For every Bob’s footprint ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௝ repeat 
step 2: 
2. Transform the footprint words, that are 
not in ܥ݋݉஺ into numerical representation 
and add them to the set ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺௜ 
 
 2. Transform the footprint words, that 
are not in ܥ݋݉஻  into numerical 
representation and add them to the set 
݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௝ 
3. Choose the parameters for a 
commutative encryption function ܧ݊ܿଵ 
 
 3. Choose the parameters for a 
commutative encryption function ܧ݊ܿଶ 
 




4. Encrypt ܥ݋݉஺, ܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵ ,…, ܦ݂݅ ஺݂ே with ܧ݊ܿଵ  
 
 4. Encrypt ܥ݋݉஻, ܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵ,…,  ܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄ 
with ܧ݊ܿଶ 
ܧ݊ܿଵሺܥ݋݉஺ሻ, ܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ேሻ 
 
 
ܧ݊ܿଶሺܥ݋݉஻ሻ, ܧ݊ܿଶሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଶሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄ሻ 
  
 
5. Encrypt ܧ݊ܿଶሺܥ݋݉஻ሻ, ܧ݊ܿଶሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵሻ, …, 
 ܧ݊ܿଶሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄ሻ with ܧ݊ܿଵ 
 
 5. Encrypt 
ܧ݊ܿଵሺܥ݋݉஺ሻ, ܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵሻ, …,  
ܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ேሻ with ܧ݊ܿଶ 
  6. Randomly permute elements in  
ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܥ݋݉஺ሻ, ܧ݊ܿଶ ܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵሻ, …,  





ᇱ ሻ, ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵᇱ ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ேᇱ ሻ 
 
 
6. Union ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺܥ݋݉஻ሻ with 
 ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄ሻ   to 
get 
ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻ଵሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௄ሻ
 
  
7. Unite ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܥ݋݉஺ᇱ ሻ  with 
ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵ
ᇱ ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂ே
ᇱ ሻ  to 
get 
ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺ଵ




For every encrypted Alice’s footprint 
ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺௜
ᇱ ሻ and for every encrypted 
Bob’s footprint ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶ൫݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௝൯ repeat 
steps 8-9: 
  
8. compare ܧ݊ܿଶܧ݊ܿଵሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺௜ᇱ ሻ and 
ܧ݊ܿଵܧ݊ܿଶ൫݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௝൯ 
  




Figure 7: Method 1 footprint comparison algorithm outline 
 
3.4.4.2 Method 2 footprint comparison algorithm 
 
Method 2 exploits modified private-matching scheme to perform footprint comparison in privacy-
preserving way. Modified private-matching scheme is a two-party protocol based on private-
matching scheme described in paragraph 2.2. Unfortunately, it wasn’t possible to use original 
private-matching scheme without any changes, because it reveals the words, containing in 
footprints intersection. In modified private matching scheme this drawback was eliminated. It 
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guarantees the privacy protection for all footprints words of every party. The description of modified 
private matching scheme steps can be found in Figure 9 below.   
 
Method 2 footprint comparison algorithm is the following. Let Alice has a set of footprints ܨ݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺ ൌ
ሼ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺ଵ, … , ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺ேሽ. Bob has a set of footprints ܨ݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻ ൌ ሼ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻ଵ, … , ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௄ሽ. As well as in 
Method1 the algorithm starts from the footprints preparation for comparison process. Alice divides 
each footprint into 2 subsets. The first one consists of the words, containing in all her footprints. 
The second one consists of the rest of the words, not containing in the first subset. Alice transforms 
every word in the subsets into numerical representation. As the result she gets subsets ܥ݋݉஺ , 
ܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵ  ,…, ܦ݂݅ ஺݂ே . The same actions are performed by Bob and he obtains the subsets 
ܥ݋݉஻ ,  ܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵ ,…,  ܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄ . Alice defines a homomorphic encryption function and sends public 
parameters to Bob. Then for every of Alice’s subsets the following steps are performed: 
 
Let Alice ‘s subset consist of {ݔଵ, … , ݔ௅ }. Alice defines a polynomial ܲ, as shown below: 





She sends encrypted coefficients to Bob. Bob evaluates the polynomial at each of his numbers of 
each of his subsets. As the result he obtains the sets 
ܧ݊ܿ൫ܲሺܥ݋݉஻ሻ൯, ܧ݊ܿ൫ܲሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵሻ൯, . . . , ܧ݊ܿሺܲሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄ሻሻ . He raises each of his result to a random 
power ݎ  and multiplies it by an encryption of 1  to get sets ܧ݊ܿሺݎ଴ · ܲሺܥ݋݉஻ሻ ൅ 1ሻ , ܧ݊ܿሺݎଵ ·
ܲሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵሻ ൅ 1ሻ ,…, ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄ · ܲሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄ሻ ൅ 1ሻ. He sends them to Alice. Alice decrypts received data, 
count the number of 1’s in each of Bob’s decrypted set. This number represents the number of 
common words, sharing by Alice’s subset and corresponding Bob’s subset. 
 
The number of common words, containing in Alice’s footprint ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺௜ and Bob’s footprint ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௝ 
for  ݅ ൌ 1, ܰ , ݆ ൌ 1, ܭ  is calculated as follows: 
 
݊ݑ݉_ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺௜, ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௝ሻ ൌ ݊ݑ݉_ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሺܥ݋݉஺, ܥ݋݉஻ሻ ൅ ݊ݑ݉_ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሺܥ݋݉஺, ܦ݂݅ ஻݂௝ሻ ൅ 
                         ൅݊ݑ݉_ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂௜, ܥ݋݉஻ሻ ൅ ݊ݑ݉_ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሺܦ݂݅ ஺݂௜, ܦ݂݅ ஻݂௝ሻ, 
 
where  ݊ݑ݉_ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሺܺ, ܻሻ is a number of common words, containing in set ܺ and set ܻ 
 
The detailed description of Method 2 footprint comparison algorithm is given in Figure 8. The 













1. Find the words, that are in all Alice’s 
footprints and transform them into 
numerical representation to get set ܥ݋݉஺ 
 
 1. Find the words, that are in all 
Bob’s footprints and transform them 
into numerical representation to get 
set ܥ݋݉஻ 
 
For every Alice’s footprint ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺௜ repeat 
step 2: 
 For every Bob’s footprint 
݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௝ repeat step 2: 
2. Transform the footprint words, that 
are not in ܥ݋݉஺  into numerical 
representation and add them to the set 
ܦ݂݅ ஺݂௜  
 
 2. Transform the footprint words, 
that are not in ܥ݋݉஻ into numerical 
representation and add them to 
the set ܦ݂݅ ஻݂௝ 
3. Choose the parameters for a 
homomorphic encryption function ܧ݊ܿ 
 
  
Public encryption parameters 
 
For every set ܵ݁ݐܣ in { ܥ݋݉஺ , ܦ݂݅ ஺݂ଵ ,…, 
ܦ݂݅ ஺݂ே} repeat steps 4-6: 
  
4. define polynomial ܲ with coefficients 
ܽ଴, … , ܽ௅ 
  
5. Encrypt coefficients, to get set  
{ܧ݊ܿሺܽ଴ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺܽ௅ሻ} 
 
  
{ܧ݊ܿሺܽ଴ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺܽ௅ሻ} 
 
 
  For every set ܵ݁ݐܤ in { ܥ݋݉஻ , 
ܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵ,…,  ܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄} do steps 3-4: 
  3. For every element in ܵ݁ݐܤ 
repat steps a-b: 
  a. Choose a random value ݎ 
 
  b. compute ܧ݊ܿሺݎ ൉ ܲሺݕሻ ൅ 1ሻ
 
  4. randomly permute elements 
in set ܧ݊ܿሺݎ ൉ ܲሺܵ݁ݐܤሻ ൅ 1ሻ to 
get ܧ݊ܿሺݎ ൉ ܲሺܵ݁ݐܤᇱሻ ൅ 1ሻ 
 
ܧ݊ܿሺݎ଴ ൉ ܲሺܥ݋݉஻
ᇱ ሻ ൅ 1ሻ, ܧ݊ܿሺݎଵ ൉ ܲሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵᇱ ሻ ൅ 1ሻ,…, 
ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄ ൉ ܲሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄
ᇱ ሻ ൅ 1ሻ 
 
 
6. For every set ܵ݁ݐܤ in { ܧ݊ܿሺݎ଴ ൉
ܲܥ݋݉ܤԢ൅1,   ܧ݊ܿሺݎ1൉ܲሺܦ݂݂݅ܤ1Ԣሻ൅1ሻ,…,  
ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄ ൉ ܲሺܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄
ᇱ ሻ ൅ 1ሻ }  
repeat steps a-b: 
  
a. Decrypt all values in ܵ݁ݐܤ   
b. Count number of 1Ԣݏ to get   
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number of common words between 
ܵ݁ݐܣ  and ܵ݁ݐܤ , denoted 
nݑ݉_ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሺܵ݁ݐܣ, ܵ݁ݐܤሻ 
 
For every Alice’s footprint ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺௜ and 
every Bob’s footprint ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௝ repeat 
steps 7-8: 
  
7. Find the number of common 
words ݊ݑ݉_ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏሺ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺௜, ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௝ሻ
  




Figure 8: Method 2 footprint comparison algorithm outline 








 Public parameters 
 
 
2. Define the polynomial ܲ with 
roots ݔଵ, … , ݔܰ and coefficients  
ܽ଴, … , ܽ௅  
 
  
3. Encrypt coefficients, to get 
set  {ܧ݊ܿሺܽ଴ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺܽ௅ሻ} 
 
  
  {ܧ݊ܿሺܽ଴ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺܽ௅ሻ}  
 
  For every Bob’s input y repeat 
steps 1-2:    
  1. Choose a random value ݎ 
 
  2. compute ܧ݊ܿሺݎ ൉ ܲሺݕሻ ൅ 1ሻ 
 
  3. randomly permute { ܧ݊ܿሺݎଵ ൉
ܲሺݕଵሻ ൅ 1ሻ,…, ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄ ൉ ܲሺݕ௄ሻ ൅ 1ሻ} 
to get  
{ ܧ݊ܿሺݎଵ ൉ ܲሺݕଵ
ᇱ ሻ ൅ 1ሻ,…, ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄ ൉
ܲሺݕ௄
ᇱ ሻ ൅ 1ሻ}  
 
{ ܧ݊ܿሺݎଵ ൉ ܲሺݕଵ
ᇱ ሻ ൅ 1ሻ,…, ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄ ൉ ܲሺݕ௄
ᇱ ሻ ൅ 1ሻ} 
 
 
4. Decrypt  ciphertexts received 
and count the number of 1’s 
 
  
5. Return the number of 1’s    
 




3.4.4.3 Word transformation into numerical representation 
Both modified private matching scheme and privacy-preserving data comparison protocol operate 
with numbers. So in order to use these methods for footprints comparison, it is necessary to 
transform all words into numerical representation. This is done according to the following rule: 
 
Each word is considered as a string of symbolsݔଵ, … , ݔே, where ݔ௜, ݅ ൌ 1, ܰ can be a number, a 
Latin letter, or one of the symbols ‘-‘, ‘ ‘, ’’ (empty symbol). For each symbol the number, 
corresponding to this symbol, is determined according to the Table 1. Then the word is represented 
as a number ܨሺݔ଴ݔଵ … ݔேሻ, calculated by the formula below:  
 
ܨሺݔ଴ݔଵ … ݔேሻ ൌ ܽ଴ሺݔேሻ · 39଴൅ܽଵሺݔேିଵሻ39ଵ ൅ ڮ ൅ ܽேሺݔ଴ሻ39ே, 
 
 
where ܽ௜ሺݔேି௜ሻ is a number corresponding to the symbol ሺݔேି௜ሻ 
 
 
Symbol  Number  Symbol Number  Symbol Number 
        
0 27  d 4  q 17 
1 28  e 5  r 18 
2 29  f 6  s 19 
3 30  g 7  t 20 
4 31  h 8  u 21 
5 32  i 9  v 22 
6 33  j 10  w 23 
7 34  k 11  x 24 
8 35  l 12  y 25 
9 36  m 13  z 26 
a 1  n 14  ‘ ‘ 37 
b 2  o 15  ‘-‘ 38 
c 3  p 16  ‘’ 0 
Table 1: Symbol encoding table 
 
3.4.5 Area names comparison 
The goal of the area names comparison is to find out the type of semantic relationship between a 
pair of documents. Without the information about semantic relationship the documents will be just 
considered as having a common part.  
 
The types of semantic relationship are the following: 
1. The area names are equal 
2. The area names of one party is equal to the some area names of another party 
3. The areas names are not equal 
 
The type of semantic relationship between documents is detected by the performing of two steps. 
During the first step the area names are compared according to the chosen method for privacy-
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preserving document similarity detection and the number of common names is found. In Method 1 
privacy-preserving data comparison protocol, given in paragraph 2.3, is used. In Method 2 modified 
private matching scheme, described in paragraph 3.4.4.2 in Figure 9, is applied. During the second 
step the type of semantic relationship between documents is determined as it described below: 
  
Let ݄ܶଵ  be Alice’s list of area names and ݄ܶଶ be Bob’s list of area names. ܮଵ is a power of ݄ܶଵ, ܮଶ 
is a power of ݄ܶଶ and ܥ݋݉ is a number of common areas, founded in first step. Then:   
 
If ܥ݋݉==0: 
 Area names are not equal 
else: 
If ܮଵ ൌ ܥ݋݉ and ܮଶ ൌ ܥ݋݉: 
  Area names are equal  
If ܮଵ ൐ ܥ݋݉ and ܮଶ ൌ ܥ݋݉: 
  Bob’s area names are equal to some Alice’s area names 
If ܮଵ ൌ ܥ݋݉ and ܮଶ ൐ ܥ݋݉: 
  Alice’s area names are equal to some Bob’s area names 
If ܮଵ ൐ ܥ݋݉ and ܮଶ ൐ ܥ݋݉: 
 Area names are not equal 
 
The general description of Method 1 and Method 2 area names comparison algorithms is given in 





For every Alice’s document repeat 
steps 1-4: 
 For every Bob’s document repeat 
steps 1-3: 
1. Transform every area name into 
numerical representation and 
encrypt with ܧ݊ܿଵ to get set 
ܧଵሺ݄ܶ஺ሻ 
 1. Transform every area name 
into numerical representation and 
encrypt with ܧ݊ܿଶ  to get set 
ܧଶሺ݄ܶ஻ሻ 





 ܧଶሺ݄ܶ஻ሻ  
 
2. Encrypt ܧଶሺ݄ܶ஻ሻ with  ܧ݊ܿଵ  to 
get set ܧଵܧଶሺ݄ܶ஻ሻ  
 
 2. Encrypt ܧଵሺ݄ܶ஺ሻ with ܧ݊ܿଶ  to 
get set ܧଶܧଵሺ݄ܶ஺ሻ 
  3. Randomly permute ܧଶܧଵሺ݄ܶ஺ሻto 





















For every Alice’s document 
ܦ݋ܿ஺ repeat steps 1-4: 
 For every Bob’s document repeat 
step 1: 
1. Transform every area 
name into numerical 
representation to get 
ܣ݄ܶଵ, … , ܣ݄ܶ௅ 
 
 1. Transform every area name 
into numerical representation to 
get the set ܤ݄ܶ݁݉݁ݏ 
2. Define the polynomial ܲ 
with roots ܣ݄ܶଵ, … , ܣ݄ܶ௅ 
and coefficients  ܽଵ, … , ܽ௅  
 
  
3. Encrypt coefficients, to 
get set 
ሼܧ݊ܿሺܽ଴ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺܽ௅ሻሽ 
 
  
ሼܧ݊ܿሺܽ଴ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺܽ௅ሻሽ 
 
 
  For every Bob’s document do steps 3-
4: 
  3. For every area name ܤ݄ܶ  in 
ܤ݄ܶ݁݉݁ݏ repeat steps a-b: 
  a. Choose a random value ݎ
 
  b. compute ܧ݊ܿሺݎ · ܲሺܤ݄ܶሻ ൅
1ሻ 
 
  4. randomly permute elements in 
set 
ܧ݊ܿሺݎଵ · ܲሺܤ݄ܶଵሻ ൅ 1ሻ, … , ܧ݊ܿሺݎெ ·
ܲܤ݄ܶܯ൅1 to get  
ܧ݊ܿሺݎᇱ · ܲሺܤ݄ܶ݁݉݁ݏᇱሻ ൅ 1ሻ 
 
{ܧ݊ܿሺݎଵᇱ · ܲሺܤ݄ܶ݁݉݁ݏଵᇱ ሻ ൅ 1, … , ܧ݊ܿሺݎ௄ᇱ · ܲሺܤ݄ܶ݁݉݁ݏ௄ᇱ ሻ ൅ 1ሻሻ} 
 
 
4. For every Bob’s document 
ܦ݋ܿ஻ repeat steps a-c: 
  
a. Decrypt all values in 




b. Count number of 1’s to get   
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number of common area 
names between ܦ݋ܿ஺  and 
ܦ݋ܿ஻, called Com 
 
c. Return Com   
Figure 11: Method 2 area names comparison algorithm outline 
. 
3.4.6 Result finding 
The following types of similarity can be determined using one of the methods for privacy-preserving 
document similarity detection: 
  
1. The documents are syntactically similar (duplicates) 
2. The documents are almost syntactically similar (near duplicates) 
3. The documents are semantically similar 
4. The documents share common part 
5. ܣ is semantically similar to the some part of ܤ 
6. ܤ is semantically similar to the some part of ܣ 
7. Documents are different 
 
In order to find a type of similarity between pair of documents, it is necessary to calculate ଵܰ and ଶܰ 
according to the formulas below: 
 
ଵܰ ൌ
݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ܿ݋݉݉݋݊ ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ




݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ܿ݋݉݉݋݊ ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ
݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ݈݈ܽ ݓ݋ݎ݀ݏ ݅݊ ܤ݋ܾᇱݏ ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ݅݊ݐ
 
 
Such similarity metric was chosen because it allows to detect the situations when one document is 
a part of another one.  
 
Then according to the ଵܰ  and ଶܰ values and type of semantic relationship, the type of document 
similarity is determined as it shown in Table 3. The intervals for ଵܰand ଶܰvalues are preliminary and 
must be revised after implementation and testing phases depending on experiments results. The 




ܣ Alice’s document 
ܤ Bob’s document 
݄ܶଵ ൌ ݄ܶଶ Area names are equal 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ 
Alice’s area names are equal to some Bob’s 
area names 
݄ܶଶ ݄ܶଵ 




݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ Area names are not equal 
ܣ ൌ ܤ syntactically The documents are syntactically similar (duplicates) 
ܣ ൎ ܤ syntactically 
Near duplicated 
The documents are almost syntactically similar 
(near duplicates) 
ܣ ൌ ܤ semantically The documents are semantically similar  
ܣ ܤ semantically 
ܣ is semantically similar to the some part of ܤ 
 
ܤ ܣ semantically ܤ is semantically similar to the some part of ܣ  
Common part The documents share common part 
ܣ ܤ Documents are different 
 
Table 2: Notations for Table 3 
 
Input parameters Output parameters 
N1 N2 Type of semantic 
relationship 
Type of document similarity 
1.0 
 
1.0 any ܣ ൌ ܤ syntactically 
Duplicate 
[0.85;1.0) any ܣ ൎ ܤ syntactically 
Near duplicated 
[0.4;0.85) any ܣ ܤ syntactically 
(0;0.4) any ܣ ܤ syntactically 
 
[0.85;1.0) 1.0 any ܣ ൎ ܤ syntactically 
Near duplicated 
[0.85;1.0) any ܣ ൎ ܤ syntactically 
Near duplicated 
[0.4;0.85) ݄ܶଵ ൌ ݄ܶଶ  ܣ ൌ ܤ semantically 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ ܣ ܤ semantically 
݄ܶଶ ݄ܶଵ ܤ ܣ semantically 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ Common part 
(0;0.4) ݄ܶଵ ൌ ݄ܶଶ  ܣ ܤ semantically 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ ܣ ܤ semantically 
݄ܶଶ ݄ܶଵ ܤ ܣ semantically 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ Common part 
 
[0.4;0.85) 1.0 any ܤ ܣ syntactically 
[0.85;1.0) ݄ܶଵ ൌ ݄ܶଶ  ܣ ൌ ܤ semantically 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ ܣ ܤ semantically 
݄ܶଶ ݄ܶଵ ܤ ܣ semantically 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ Common part 
[0.4;0.85) ݄ܶଵ ൌ ݄ܶଶ  ܣ ൌ ܤ semantically 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ ܣ ܤ semantically 
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݄ܶଶ ݄ܶଵ ܤ ܣ semantically 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ Common part 
(0;0.4) any ܣ ܤ 
 
(0;0.4) 1.0 any ܤ ܣ syntactically 
[0.85;1.0) ݄ܶଵ ൌ ݄ܶଶ  ܤ ܣ semantically 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ ܣ ܤ semantically 
݄ܶଶ ݄ܶଵ ܤ ܣ semantically 
݄ܶଵ ݄ܶଶ Common part 
[0.4;0.85) any ܣ ܤ 
(0;0.4) any ܣ ܤ 
0 0 any ܣ ܤ 
Table 3: Documents similarity type finding table 
3.5 Implementation 
In this paragraph the implementation step is given in details. In contrast to the design part, the 
description is presented separately for each method. 
 
3.5.1 Method 1 implementation 
Method 1 was implemented according to the design specification described in paragraph 3.4 in the 
following way. Let Alice and Bob represent two parties. Alice is responsible for finding the similarity 
types between documents. Method 1 starts with the procedure that checks if both parties have 
documents to compare. The next step is a knowledge base preparation. During this step each party 
gathers together all necessary data for footprint and area finding steps execution. Having prepared 
the knowledge base, Alice and Bob find areas and footprints for their documents. If some document 
contains less than 20 words, this document doesn’t participate in comparison process any more. 
It’s prohibited to compare small size footprints in order to eliminate the opportunity to reveal the 
words of the other party footprints. If at least one party has all footprint containing less than 20 
words, Method 1 execution is stopped. Else method execution is proceeding and parties send the 
lists of their document names to each other. After that Alice and Bob choose the parameters for 
their Massey-Omura encryption functions. Then footprints are compared and Alice gets the number 
of common words between each of her footprints and every Bob’s one. According to these results, 
she finds the types of similarity between their documents.  
 
The general overview of all Method 1 implementation steps is given in Figure 12. The detailed 
overview of each step can be found below.  
 
1. Check if Alice and Bob have documents to compare. If they have, go step 2, else STOP 
2. Each party performs knowledge base preparation step 
3. Each party finds areas and footprint for every document 
4. Each party deletes all documents, whose footprints contain less than 20 words  
5. Check if Alice and Bob have documents to compare. If they have, go step 6, else STOP 
6. Each party sends the list of the document names to another party 
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7. Footprint comparison 
8. Alice finds the types of similarity between documents   
Figure 12: Method 1 implementation steps overview 
 
3.5.1.1 Knowledge base preparation 
 
Several databases were used to form a knowledge base. The first one, called in the report as NLTK 
database, consists of the databases proposed by Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK). NLTK is an 
open source library that can be freely downloaded from [29]. “It was originally created in 2001 as a 
part of a computational linguistics course in the Department of Computer and Information Science 
at the University of Pennsylvania.  
Since then it has been developed and expanded with the help of dozens of contributors. It has now 
been adopted in courses in dozens of universities, and serves as the basis of many research 
projects.” [30]. NLTK database is used for part of speech tagging and stemming.  
 
The second database, called PoS (Part of Speech) database, was created to improve the part of 
speech tagging process and to be used for deleting of the frequently used words.  It consists of 
seven .txt files. The file names and their description can be found in Table 4. The content of all files 
can be found in Appendix A. The stop words and phrases were taken from [31], [32], [33], the 
prepositions - from [34], [35], [36], and adverbs – from [37], [38], [39].  
 
File name Description 
stopwords_mult.txt Contains stopwords, that are phrases 
stopwords_one.txt Contains stopwords, that are single words  
preposit_mult.txt Contains prepositions, that are phrases 
preposit_one.txt Contains prepositions, that are single words  
adverb_mult.txt Contains adverb, not ending with –ly, that are phrases 
adverb_one.txt Contains adverb words, not ending with –ly, that are single words 
nonadverb.txt Contains the words, ending with –ly, that are not adverbs 
Table 4: PoS database files 
 
Another data base, called Ontology database, was created for ontology implementation. This 
database consists of 3 files: ontology_structure.txt, ontology_mult.txt, ontology_one.txt. The first file 
contains information about ontology areas names, and number of terms, describing these areas. 
The second file contains ontology term phrases, and the third one contains ontology single words 
terms. These files have fixed structures. They are the following:           
 











Area is a name of area, 
Name_parent is a name of ancestor area for Area 
Num_area is a number of terms, describing Area 








Term denotes the ontology term, consisting of two or more words.  








Term denote the ontology term, consisting of single word.  
Area  is a name of area, described by Term 
 
For ontology implementation the computer security domain was chosen. For the testing purpose 
only the authorization area was processed. Authorization area contains the role-based access 
control, mandatory access control, discretionary access control and multilevel access control areas. 
Multilevel access control consists of Bel-Lapadula area. For formation of the ontology term sets, the 
following sources were used: [47], [48], [49]. The ontology object diagram is presented in Figure 
13.The content of ontology database can be found in Appendix B.  
 
     




The knowledge base structure overview is given below in Figure 14. 
 
     
 
Figure 14: Knowledge base overview 
In order to prepare the knowledge base the following steps should be performed: 
 
1. Load stop words : phrases, words from stopwords_mult.txt, stopwords_one.txt 
2. Load prepositions: phrase, words from preposit_mult.txt, preposit_one.txt 
3. Load adverbs: phrases, words from adverb_mult.txt, adverb_one.txt 
4. Load not adverbs, ending with –ly from nonadverb_ly.txt 
5. Load data base from NLTK module 
6. Load ontology terms: phrases, words from ontology_mult.txt, ontology_one.txt 
7. Load ontology structure from ontology_structure.txt 
 
3.5.1.2 Area and footprint finding 
 
The area and footprint finding steps are implemented according to the description given in 
paragraphs 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, respectively. During the implementation these steps were united 
together for optimization of the finding process. 
 
In order to find areas and footprint the following steps are implemented: 
 
1. Make all letters to be lower-case 
2. Delete all end of line symbols ‘\n’ 
3. For every phrase in the list of ontology term phrases, check if it is in the document. If it is, then 
delete it from the document, and add to the list of document terms without stemming and to the 
footprint after stemming 
4.  For every phrase in the list of preposition phrases, check if it is in the document. If it is, then 
delete it from the document.  
5. For every phrase in the list of adverb phrases, check if it is in the document. If it is, then delete it 
from the document. 
6. For every phrase in the list of stop words phrases, check if it is in the document. If it is, then 
delete it from the document. 
7. Tokenize the reduced document. Tokens shouldn’t include any symbols or be the symbol. 
Composite adjective should be divided into 2 parts. No repetitions are allowed. 
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8. For every word in the list of ontology terms, check if it is in the token list. If it is, then delete it 
from the token, and add to the list of document terms without stemming and to the footprint after 
stemming, if it hasn’t been added before. 
9. For every token, check if it is in the list of preposition words. If it is, then delete it from the token 
list 
10. For every token, check if it is in the list of stopwords. If it is, then delete it from the token list 
11. For every token check if it is an adverb :  
a. Check if it is in the list of adverb words .If it is, then delete it from the token list 
b. Check if it ends with –ly. If it does and it is in the list with not adverbs words, ending with –ly, 
then add this token to the footprint after stemming . Delete token from the token list . 
12. For every token find its part of speech. 
13. Delete all tokens, except nouns, adjectives and verbs 
14. Make stemming for every token 
15. Delete repetitions in stemming token list and add them to the footprint list. Footprint is ready 
16. For every found ontology term find the areas it describes. 
17. For every found area ݄ܶ do following: 
Let ݐ݁ݎ݉ݏ்௛  be the number of founded in document terms describing the area ݄ܶ , and 
ܣ݈݈_ݐ݁ݎ݉ݏ்௛ be the number of ontology terms in term set, describing area ݄ܶ.  
 
Find ܧ ൌ ௧௘௥௠௦೅೓
஺௟௟_௧௘௥௠௦೅೓
  
    
If ܧ< 0.1, then document contents doesn’t related to the area ݄ܶ. Otherwise add its name to the 
list of document area names. 
 
Stemming, part of speech tagging and tokenization were performed by functions ݏݐ݁݉ሺሻ, ݌݋ݏ_ݐܽ݃ሺሻ, 
and ݓ݋ݎ݀_ݐ݋݇݁݊݅ݖ݁ሺሻ, respectively, implemented in NLTK module.      
 
 
3.5.1.3 Footprint comparison 
 
Footprint comparison was implemented exactly as it was described in paragraph 3.4.4. In order to 
encrypt footprint words and area names the Massey-Omura cryptosystem was applied. It was 




1.  Bob generates public key ݍ, that is a random positive prime 1024 bit long number. 
2. Alice selects public key ݁ଵ , a random positive prime 256 bit long number and computes 
݀ଵ ൌ ݁ଵିଵ݉݋݀ ݍ െ 1. 
3. Alice selects public key ݁ଶ , a random positive prime 256 bit long number and computes  




The usage of prime numbers as a public keys ݁ଵ, ݁ଶ guaranties that conditions ݃ܿ݀ሺ݁ଵ, ݍ െ 1ሻ ൌ 1 
and ݃ܿ݀ሺ݁ଶ, ݍ െ 1ሻ are met. For finding large prime number the function ݃݁ݐܲݎ݅݉݁ሺሻ from standard 
python module “number”, was used. To find ݀ଵ and ݀ଶ, the function ݅݊ݒ݁ݎݏ݁ሺሻ, containing in the 




Let ݉  to be a number to be encrypted. Then encryption of ݉ will be calculated as ܿ ൌ  ݉݁݉݋݀ ݍ, 
where ݁ is Alice’s or Bob’s private key.  
 
Unfortunately, it wasn’t possible to use standard python function ݌݋ݓሺሻ for encryption, because it 
can’t operate with a numbers of such long size. So the new procedure was created. It calculates 
the modulus of the numbers of any length and is based on the modulus properties and function 
݌݋ݓሺሻ. The following modulus properties were used: 
 
1. If ܾ is odd, then ܽ௕݉݋݀ ܰ ൌ ሺܽ ݉݋݀ ܰ כ ܽ௕ିଵ݉݋݀ ܰሻ ݉݋݀ ܰ. 
2. If ܾ is even, then ܽ௕݉݋݀ ܰ ൌ ሺܽ
್
మ ݉݋݀ ܰሻଶ݉݋݀ ܰ 
 
The code of procedure for finding ܽ௕݉݋݀ ܰ, is presented below in Figure 15 
 
 
def large_modulus(a,b,N):  
 
    m=1 
    while b>0: 
        if not b%2==0: 
            m=m*a 
            m=pow(m,1,N) 
        b=b/2 
        a=pow(a*a,1,N) 
         
    return m 
Figure 15: Modulus finding procedure 
3.5.1.4 Result finding 
Since it is not always required to find the semantic relationship between documents, the area 
names comparison step is executed only when it is needed. Decision if semantic relationship 
finding is needed is made during the result finding step. 
 
Result finding step was implemented as it is described in paragraph 3.4.5. The area name 




3.5.2 Method 2 implementation 
Method 2 was implemented according to the description given in paragraph 3.4. It has the same 
steps, as Method 1 has. They can be found in paragraph 3.5.1 in Figure 12.  These steps, except of 
footprint and area names comparison ones, are implemented in the same way as it were done for 
Method 1 (see paragraph 3.5.1). The description of footprint and area names comparison steps 
implementation is given below.   
 
3.5.2.1 Footprint comparison 
Footprint comparison was implemented according to the algorithm, given in Figure 8 in paragraph 
3.4.4.2. This algorithm is based on the usage of homomorphic encryption. In Method 2 Paillier’s 
cryptosystem was used. It was implemented as follows: 
 
Key generation  
1. Choose two 512 bit long prime numbers ݌ and ݍ 
2. Set ݊ ൌ ݌ · ݍ  
3. Set ݃ ൌ ݊ ൅ 1 
4. Consider ݊, ݃ as public parameters and ݌, ݍ as private ones. 
 
Encryption 
1.Let ݉ be a plaintext to be encrypted, where ݉ א Ժ௡כ   
2. Select a random 1023 bits long number ݎ 
3. Compute ciphertext ܿ ൌ ݃௠ · ݎ௡ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ ൌ ሺ݃௠ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ  ·  ݎ௡ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶሻ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ 
 
Decryption 
1. Given ciphertext ܿ א Ժ௡మ
כ  
2. Compute plaintext ൌ ܮ൫ܿఒ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ൯ · ቀܮ൫݃ఒ ݉݋݀ ݊ଶ൯ቁ
ିଵ
݉݋݀ ݊ , where ܮሺݑሻ ൌ ௨ିଵ
௡
 




The functions, applied for prime numbers finding, calculating of the modulus of large numbers and 
multiplicative inverse to the modulus are the same as in Massey-Omura Cryptosystem 
implementation description in paragraph 3.5.5.3. Function ܩܥܦሺሻ  from standard python module 
“number” was used to find the great common divisor. 
 
In order to use Paillier’s cryptosystem, the modified private matching scheme was adapted. Instead 
of comparison of all elements the set at once, the set is divided into subsets, so that the 
multiplication of all elements in every subset is less than public key n. This is done to be sure that 
all coefficients are less than n and will be encrypted in a proper way. The number of common 
elements between two sets is a summation of number of common elements between each subset 
of one party and set of another party.   
 
The footprint comparison step was implemented in such way that while one party is finding the 
polynomial values, the other party finds the coefficient of the new polynomial and decrypts the 
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values of the previous one. The simultaneous performance of operations by parties reduces the 
execution time significantly.   
 
The overview of footprint comparison implementation step is given in Figure 16. The description of 





1. Find the words, that are in all Alice’s 
footprints and transform them into 
numerical representation to get set ܥ݋݉஺   
 
 1. Find the words, that are in all 
Bob’s footprints and transform 
them into numerical 
representation to get set ܥ݋݉஻  
 
For every Alice’s footprint ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஺௜  repeat 
step 2: 
 For every Bob’s footprint ݂݋݋ݐ݌ݎ஻௝ 
repeat step 2: 
 
2. Transform the footprint words, that are 
not in ܥ݋݉஺ into numerical representation 
and add them to the set D݂݅ ஺݂௜  
 
 2. Transform the footprint 
words, that are not in ܥ݋݉஻ into 
numerical representation and 
add them to the set ܦ݂݅ ஻݂௝ 
3. Choose the parameters for a 
homomorphic encryption function ܧ݊ܿ 
 
  
Public encryption parameters 
 
For every set ܵ݁ݐܣ  in { ܥ݋݉஺  , D݂݅ ஺݂ଵ ,…, 
D݂݅ ஺݂ே } repeat steps 4: 
 
  
4. find the number of common 
elements between ܵ݁ݐܣ and every 
set from the {  ܥ݋݉஻   ,  ܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵ ,…, 
ܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄}, according to the algorithm 
in Figure 17 
 3. help Alice to compare Alice’s 
setA and Bob’s set  
{  ܥ݋݉஻   ,  ܦ݂݅ ஻݂ଵ ,…, ܦ݂݅ ஻݂௄ }, 
according to the algorithm in 
Figure 17 





1.Start position ܵݐ ൌ 0 
 
 1.Receive ܧ݊ܿ_ܥ݋݂݁ 
2.Find the index ܧ݊݀  of ܵ݁ݐܣ  element, 
such that ݈݁ௌ௧ · … · ݈݁ா௡ௗ ൏ ܰ  and 
݈݁ௌ௧ · … · ݈݁ா௡ௗାଵ ൐ ܰ 
 
 For every element ݕ  in every set 
{ܵ݁ݐ஻ଵ, . . , ܵ݁ݐ஻௄},   do steps 2-3: 
3. Define polynomial ܲ  with set of 
coefficients ܥ݋݂݁  with roots 
݈݁ௌ௧, … , ݈݁ா௡ௗ 
 
 2. generate random number ݎ in range 
(5;35) 
4. Encrypt coefficients to get set 
ܧ݊ܿ_ܥ݋݂݁ 




5.Send ܧ݊ܿ_ܥ݋݂݁  
 
 4. Send values Val 
6. If ܵݐ ൌ ܮ, do steps 7-10, else go to 
the step 11: 
 5. data =”more” 
7. Receive encrypted values of 
polynomial with coefficients 
ܽଵ, … , ܽௌ௧ିா௡ௗ form Bob 
 
 While data is not equal to ”done”, do steps 6-
7: 
8. send “done” to Bob 
 
 6.Receive data 
9.Decrypt values and count the 
number of 1’s for every Bob’s set 
separately 
 
 7. If data not =”done” do steps 8-10: 
10. Return the number of 1’s for 
every set 
 
 8.Receive C݋݂݁ 
11. for ݅ ൌ 0, ܭ ܰݑ݉_݋݊݁௜=0   9.For every element y in ݕ  in every set 
{ܵ݁ݐ஻ଵ, . . , ܵ݁ݐ஻௄} do step a-b: 
 
12. while ܧ݊݀ ് ܮ, repeat steps 13-23:  a. generate random number r in range 
(5;35) 
 
13. ܵݐ ൌ ܧ݊݀  b. Find the  value of  
ܧ݊ܿሺݎ · ܲሺݕሻ ൅ 1ሻ 
 
14.ܥ݋݂݁_݋݈݀ ൌ ܥ݋݂݁ 
 
 10. Send all values 
15. Find the new index ܧ݊݀ of ܵ݁ݐܣ 
element, such that ݈݁ௌ௧ · … · ݈݁ா௡ௗ ൏
ܰ and ݈݁ௌ௧ · … · ݈݁ா௡ௗାଵ ൐ ܰ 
 
  
16. Define polynomial ܲ with set of 
coefficients ܥ݋݂݁  with roots 
݈݁ௌ௧, … , ݈݁ா௡ௗ 
 
  
17. Encrypt coefficients to get 
ܧ݊ܿݎ_ܥ݋݂݁ 
  
18.Receive encrypted values of 
polynomial with coefficient ܥ݋݂݁_݋݈݀ 
  
15.send “more”   
15. send ܧ݊ܿݎ_ܥ݋݂݁   
16. Decrypt values of polynomial 
with coefficient ܥ݋݂݁_݋݈݀  and count 
the number of 1’s for every Bob’s 
set separately to get 
{݊ݑ݉଴, ݊ݑ݉ଵ, . . , ݊ݑ݉௄} 
  
19. ݅ ൌ 0, ܭ  ܰݑ݉௢௡௘೔ ൌ ܰݑ݉௢௡௘೔ ൅
݊ݑ݉௜ 
  
20. If ܧ݊݀ ൌ ܮ, do steps a-c, else go 




a. receive encrypted values of 
polynomial with coefficients 
ܥ݋݂݁ 
  
b. Decrypt values of polynomial 
with coefficient ܥ݋݂݁_݋݈݀  and 
count the number of 1’s for 
every Bob’s set separately to get 
{݊ݑ݉଴, ݊ݑ݉ଵ, . . , ݊ݑ݉௄} 
  
c. ݅ ൌ 0, ܭ ܰݑ݉௢௡௘೔ ൌ ܰݑ݉௢௡௘೔ ൅
݊ݑ݉௜ 
  
d. return ܰݑ݉_݋݊݁   
Figure 17: Sets comparison algorithm description  
 




    n=len(number_list) 
    coeff=[0,0]      
 
    M1=[-1*number_list[0],1] 
    M2=[0,0] 
    for k in range(1,n): 
            M2=[-1*number_list[k],1]     
            for t in range(k+1):  
                coeff[t]=0  
            coeff.append(0) 
             
            for i in range(0,k+1): 
                for j in range(0,2): 
                    coeff[i+j]+=M1[i]*M2[j] 
 
            M1.append(0) 
 
            for t in range(k+2): 
                p=coeff[t] 
                M1[t]=p 
 
    return coeff 
Figure 18: find_coeff() function  implementation 
 
Let polynomial Pሺtሻ ൌ ሺxଵ െ tሻሺxଶ െ tሻ … ሺxL െ tሻ ൌ ∑ a୳t୳L୳ୀ଴  and N to be a public key of Pailier’s 
cryptosystem. Then value of expression ܧ݊ܿሺݎ · ܲሺݕሻ ൅ 1ሻ is found according to the following 
formula: 
ܧ݊ܿሺݎ · ܲሺݕሻ ൅ 1ሻ ൌ ܧ݊ܿ൫ܲሺݕሻ൯
௥
· ܧ݊ܿሺ1ሻ݉݋݀ ܰଶ, where 
ܧ݊ܿ൫ܲሺݕሻ൯ ൌ ቀ∏ ܧ݊ܿሺܽ௜ሻ௬
೔௅
௜ୀ଴ ݉݋݀ ܰ





3.5.2.2 Area names comparison 
 
During the result finding the type of semantic relationship between documents may be required. 
The area names comparison is based on the algorithm described in Figure 11 in paragraph 3.4.5 
and the algorithm for sets comparison presented in Figure 17 in paragraph 3.5.2.1. The description 
of area names comparison algorithm implementation is given in Figure 19. 
 
Alice  Bob 
For every Alice’s  document repeat step 1-3:  For every Bob’s  document repeat 
step 1-2: 
1. Transform area names into numerical 
representation to get set ݄ܶ݁݉ ஺݁   
 
 1. Transform area names into 
numerical representation to get 
set ݄ܶ݁݉݁஻ 
2.Compare ݄ܶ݁݉ ஺݁   with every set 
{݄ܶ݁݉݁஻ଵ,…,݄ܶ݁݉݁஻௄}  to get the number 
of common area names according to 
algorithm in Figure 17 
 2. help Alice to compare  
݄ܶ݁݉ ஺݁  and sets  
{ ݄ܶ݁݉݁஻ଵ ,…, ݄ܶ݁݉݁஻௄ } 
according to the algorithm in 
Figure 17 
3.Return the number of common area names 
Figure 19: Method 2 area names comparison implementation description 
 
3.5.3 Non-privacy document similarity detection method implementation 
The algorithm for non-privacy document similarity detection, called non-privacy method, was 
implemented to find out in how many times the performance of methods for privacy-preserving 
document similarity detection will increase in comparison with non-privacy method. 
 
Non-privacy method has the same steps as Methods 1. They can be found in paragraph 3.5.1 in 




Different experiments were executed to estimate performance and to check functionality of Method 
1 and Method 2. The description of the testing process is given in this chapter. The obtained results 
are interpreted in Discussion.    
 
3.6.1 Testing environment description 
CPU Intel Celeron (32bit) 2GHz, RAM 1GB 
OS Ubuntu Linux 10.04 
Python version 2.6.5 
Both peers were run on the same machine. 
For execution time calculation standard python function time() was used. Execution time was 




3.6.2 Testing data 
41 articles were selected from ACM [50] and IEEE [51] digitals libraries. Their sizes varied between 
200 and 1000 words. Articles are related to the different areas, such as role-based access control, 
encryption, text mining, document similarity detection and so on.  
 
3.6.3 Method 1 performance measurement 
All experiments were done with aim to estimate performance and to check functionality.  The 
obtained results are given below. 
 
1. Since comparison execution time depends on the size of footprints, the series of tests were 





Figure 20: Footprint size versus original document size 
 
 
2.  Another experiments were performed to measure the time required to find footprint depending 




























Figure 21: Footprint finding execution time 
 
 
3.  The next experiments were done to compare Method 1 and Non-private method performances. 





Figure 22: Method 1 performance versus Non-private method performances 
 
 
4. Also there were some experiments whose aim was to compare the execution time needed to find 
the type of similarity between duplicates and different documents with the same size of footprints as 
duplicates have. It was done to be sure that the Method 1 performance doesn’t depend on the type 





























































































Figure 23: Comparison of time required to detect the similarity type between duplicates and different 
documents 
 
5. Also some experments were performed to check if performance was improved because of 
dividing each footprint into two subsets (subset with the words, contains in every footprint of one 
party and the one with rest footprint words). This were done by the comparisson of the execution 
time, required to compare one Bob’s documents with several Alice’s documents at once or 





Figure 24: Comparison of time required to compare Bob's document with several Alice's documents at once 
or separately for each document pair. 
 
 
6. The aim of these experiments was to find out how the Method 1 performance increases if the 


















































Figure 25: Method 1 performance versus the number of documents at each side. 
 
3.6.4 Method 2 performance measurement: 
 
1.  Several experiments were performed to measure Method 2 performance. The results are 





Figure 26: Method 2 performance 
 

















































3.6.5 Functionality validation 
In order to validate the methods functionality 41 articles were pairwise compared. The list of 
document pairs together with short description is given in Table 5. The obtained type of similarity is 
presented in Table 6. 
 
 
Number of  pair Expected type of similarity Articles description 
1  Different Both articles have the same topic. Authors 
analyzing the same articles. But they are written in 
absolutely different ways 
 
 
2 Different Both articles have the same topic. But their contents 
are different 
3 Semantically similar (since 
RBAC area is contained in 
ontology) 
The articles have the same structures across all 
documents. There are identical parts of text as well 
as rephrased ones. In the article the same RBAC 
system is discussed, but authors use different 
names for the system components. 
4 different Authors discuss absolutely different algorithms for 
duplicates finding  
5 Common part (because 
articles topic is not in 
ontology) 
The articles have the same author. The article [7] is 
a short version of [10].  
6 Different (since the 
common part is too short 
to detect any similarity) 
The abstract and little part in the introduction is 
identical. The rest of the documents are absolutely 
different. 
 
Other pairs Different All other articles are different.  
Table 5: Document pairs participating in functionality validation process 
 
Document pair Expected type of 
similarity 
Obtained type of 
similarity with ontology 
usage 
1 Different Common part 
2 Different Common part 
3 Semantically similar Semantically similar 
4 Different Common part 
5 Common part Common part 
6 Different  Different 
Other pairs Different Different 





In a scope of this project the attempt were made to develop a method for identification of both 
syntactically and semantically similar documents in a privacy-preserving way. Documents are 
analysed using the ontology and main document subject areas are identified. Obtained subject 
areas are securely compared to determine semantic relationship between corresponding 
documents. Then documents are transformed into the sets of distinct meaningful words, called 
footprints and these sets are compared in privacy-preserving way. The type of similarity between 
two documents is determined according to the number of common words in footprints and 
documents semantic relationship The usage of the footprints but not the complete original 
document for documents comparison leads to the significant execution time reduction. But such 
approach has a drawback. It's not possible to determine if two compared documents are absolutely 
similar or one document was obtained from another one by making inessential changes, such as 
substitution of some words with synonyms, or changing the words order. To distinguish such cases, 
additional word-by-word comparison may be needed. As the area of application of document 
comparison tools (plagiarism detection and etc.) assumes that most of the documents are different, 
such additional word-by-word comparison step is needed rarely and thus doesn't lead to significant 
performance degradation.  
 
To transform the document into the footprint some Natural Language Processing techniques were 
applied. There are a lot of tools for NLP processing available, for example [40],[41],[42]. In this 
project the natural language toolkit [29] was used. It was chosen because it's distributed under 
open source license, has large knowledge base and good documentation. Unfortunately, it doesn’t 
always determine the part of speech correctly, therefore some additional measures were taken to 
guarantee that method works in a proper way.  
 
To find the documents subject areas the ontology was used. For this project only the ontology for 
authorization area of computer security domain was developed. But it can be easily extended with 
the other areas or domains. The main difference of this project ontology from the existing ones is 
that it is focused on the terms and what areas they describe, rather than on the areas of computer 
security domain and relations between them, as it is done in ontologies, described in [43], [44], [45], 
[46]. Real tool for the document comparison will use large ontology database and of course it will 
worsen the tool performance. But the subject area searching time can be reduced due to the fact 
that in a real use case the documents from the same domain most likely to be compared.  It doesn't 
take sense to use astrophysics ontology comparing the anatomy articles.  
 
Several approaches were considered for privacy-preserving footprints and subject areas 
comparison. They are vector space model, fingerprints and private-matching scheme. It was 
decided to use the private - matching scheme in this project. The vector space model was refused 
because it doesn't allow to detect the situation, when one document is a part of another one. The 
disadvantage of fingerprint approach is that it is very sensitive to the word order and, thus not 
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suitable for finding near duplicates. Such documents will be considered to be different. The private 
matching scheme doesn't have such disadvantages. It enables to identify all situations listed in 
paragraph 3.1. Also it is rather uncommon approach that has never been applied to the document 
comparison. It was interesting to evaluate its performance in such application. The drawback of 
private matching scheme is that it requires a lot of calculations in order to get the number of 
common words. 
 
 As the alternative way for secure comparison, original privacy preserving comparison protocol 
utilising the properties of commutative encryption, was designed. If each party has several 
documents for comparison than this protocol requires much less data transfers comparing with 
private-matching scheme. Additional time, consuming by calculation apart from the encryption, are 
not required. The method, based on this protocol, was expected to be rather fast and effective.  
As the result, two methods for privacy-preserving document similarity detection were designed, 
implemented and tested. The testing showed that Method 2, based on modified privacy-preserving 
scheme, is very slow and isn't suitable for documents comparison. Execution time grows very fast, 
because it is necessary to divide the footprint into different parts to be able to encrypt the 
coefficients correctly. Method 1, based on privacy-preserving data comparison protocol, shows a 
good performance. It was experimentally determined that its execution time depends on the size of 
footprints and the number of documents of each party and has linear growth. Also It was proved 
(Figure 24) that separate handling of the common part of the footprints significantly speeds up 
Method 1 execution.  
 
As for detecting of similarity types between documents, the Method1 has done it correctly, except 
of two cases. The first case was described in first paragraph of this chapter. The second case is 
following. When documents are from the same narrow area but contain different information, they 
considered as having common part. The reason of that is that the meaningful words are almost the 
same although they describe different things. To deal with it, the additional word-by-word 
comparison of documents is required. The wrong detection of similarity type showed that it is 
possible to apply this approach for privacy-preserving document clustering. 
 
In order to prevent the revealing of the document contents during the comparison process, two 
approaches were applied. Both modified private matching scheme and privacy-preserving data 
comparison protocol guarantee the privacy of the data transfers, if the parameters of cryptosystems, 
used in them, are chosen correctly. During the implementation of Paillier’s and Massey-Omura 
cryptosystems the size for public and private keys were selected in such way that the decryption of 
the transfer data will be practically useless. The developed methods don’t required the presence of 
third party but doesn’t guarantee the protection against man-in-the-middle attacks. So the secure 
connection should be established between peers. In order to provide privacy protection against 





5  Conclusion 
The goal of this project was to develop a method for privacy-preserving document similarity 
detection. It should identify either semantically or syntactically similar documents. As the result two 
methods were developed. Both of them have the following structure. At first, the areas the 
documents are related to are found. Then documents are transformed into the set of distinct 
meaningful words. These sets as well as documents subject areas are compared in a secure way. 
In the first method the original privacy-preserving data comparison protocol was used for secure 
comparison. In the second method the modified private-matching scheme was used for same 
purpose. Based on the comparison results the type of similarity between documents is identified. 
Both of the methods provide privacy protection for the documents content of the parties. 
 
Currently, based on testing results, the following types of document similarity are detected: near 
duplicates, one document is semantically or syntactically contained in another one, syntactically 
similar documents and different ones. In order to detect if two documents are syntactically similar or 
share the common part the additional word-by-word document comparison should be performed.  
 
During the testing phase the method, based on the modified private-matching scheme, showed that 
it is very slow and isn't suitable for the privacy-preserving document similarity detection. Another 
method, on the contrary, was found to have very good performance and can be used for creation of 
the tool for privacy-preserving document detection. But it needs some improvements, such as 
adding the extra comparison of all documents words when it might be required. More statistics 
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in the forefront of 
at the forefront of 
in demand 
on demand  
in focus 
out of focus 
in touch 
out of touch 
in sight 
within sight 
in a flash 
in a hurry 
in a mess 
in a sense 
in advance 
in agreement with 
in aid of 
in all likelihood 




in comparison with 
in confinement 
in conjunction with 
in connection with 
in consequence of 
in contrast with 
in contrast to 
in disorder 
outside of 
once in a while 
of course 
side by side 
side to side 
so that 
very much 
during long time 
during short time 




for the good of 
for the sake of 
for want of 
in accordance with 
in addition to 
in case of 
inside of 
instead of 
in front of 
in lieu of 
in place of 
in point of 
in spite of 
in the end 
owing to 
on behalf of 
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at any cost 
at any rate 
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